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Introduction:   




The voter turnout gap has plagued many elections around the world, with 
differential levels of participation between groups having the potential to 
effect election results and policy outcomes.  Despite this, there has been 
little empirical or normative theorisation of the interventions that can be 
used redress the turnout gap and other inequalities within the electoral 
process.  This article defines the concept of inclusive voting practices to refer 
to policy instruments which can reduce turnout inequality between groups 
and mitigate other inequalities within the electoral process.  This is anchored 
in a strategic-relational theory of structure, agency and political change.  
Different state responses are conceptualised and the normative case for an 
interventionist rather than repressive or laissez-faire approaches is set out.  
A research agenda is set out which is taken up in subsequent articles in this 
special issue. 
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Writing in 1960, Schattschneider (1960, 98-111) noted how only approximately 60 out of 100 
million eligible voters in America cast their ballot.  Considering the possible effects of universal turnout 
he suggested that:  
 
‘The whole balance of power in the political system could be overturned by a massive invasion 
of the political system… the unused political potential is sufficient to blow the United States 
off the face of the earth’ (p.98).    
 
Fast forward into the twenty-first century and the consequences of voter turnout – or non-turnout 
are felt in the US and in other countries around the world.  Whether it is the US Presidential election, 
landmark referendums such as the UK Brexit referendum, or the contest for the Nigerian Presidency: 
voting matters.  The effects of the ballots cast at the polls have decisive impacts on national politics, 
public policy and even the broader international system. However, the votes that are not cast make a 
profound difference too. Turnout levels are often low, uneven and the results of many elections may 
have been different with fuller participation.  This has a renewed importance in established 
democracies where new electoral cleavages have arisen.  It is commonly thought, for example, that 
these cleavages are based around age (Norris and Inglehart 2018), but since young people are much 
less likely to vote, electoral outcomes are less likely to be in their favour.  Meanwhile, variations in 
turnout has a continued importance in electoral autocracies which are struggling to make the full 
transition to liberal democracy because, amongst other reasons, turnout is reduced by threats of 
electoral violence, keeping autocrats in power.  
Voter turnout is affected by many factors, but the machinery of the electoral process plays a 
crucial role. America has a long history of the political elite using racially-based discriminatory 
practices to deter citizens from voting (James 2012).  The passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was 
designed to eliminate this, but concerns remain today as restrictive voter ID requirements have been 
rolled out across many states (Hasen 2012).  The US experience, however, is too infrequently situated 
into broader international experience.  Threats to inclusive voting practices are emerging elsewhere, 
as the UK and Canada have introduced, and revised their voter identification requirements.  In Africa, 
biometric technologies have required citizens to have their fingerprints taken before registering and 
voting.  Poor provisions for overseas voters have prevented diaspora populations from voting in 
central America and elsewhere.  Violence against voters remains a fundamental problem which deters 
many groups from going to the polls.   
The academic literature in this area remains underdeveloped.  Democratic theory rightly 
preaches that elections should be ‘free and fair’ (Dahl 1971), but rarely makes reference to the 
importance of inclusive and convenient polling practices.  There are ‘best practices’ in the 
international community (Carter Center 2014), which argue for inclusive procedures, but these remain 
unconnected to political theory. Work by political scientists in the US on American democracy does 
not necessarily capture the nature of the threats in other parts of the world, or propose workable 
solutions to them.  A broader reconceptualization of the concept of ‘inclusive voting procedures’ is 
required to unify these literatures and enable a global approach to promoting fuller turnout.   
This introduction to the special issue on inclusive voting practices will begin by considering 
the nature of group-level inequality in voter turnout worldwide.  It will then review existing work on 
how institutional procedures can shape voter turnout.  Next, it will define the concept of inclusive 
voting processes through a strategic-relational approach.  Different state responses to voting 
inequality are considered and the case for an interventionalist approach is laid out. Finally, the special 
issue ahead is briefly summarised, which takes on the agenda for considering inclusive voting 
practices. 
The Global Turnout Gap 
Literature on voter turnout has long demonstrated that the characteristics of people who turn 
out to vote, and the characteristics of those who stay away are not the same. Some of the most 
important socio-demographic variables considered in this literature include age, income, education, 
gender, ethnicity and disability, as well as attitudinal variables such as political interest (Smets and van 
Ham 2013). It is important to note, however, that much of this literature rests on study of established 
democracies.  
First, studies have broadly demonstrated that voter turnout increases from youth to middle 
age, and then experiences a slight decline for the oldest age groups. The reasons for lower voter 
turnout among the youngest voters stem from a variety of factors including lower levels of political 
interest, civic duty, social pressure, and the perceived importance of voting (Jankowski and Strate 
1995; Smets and van Ham 2013; Strate et al. 1989). Literature on voter turnout has also suggested a 
slight decline in turnout among seniors, possibly due to health issues or difficulties in getting to the 
polls (Cutler and Bengtson 1974; Norris 2002; Smets and van Ham 2013). These studies suggest that 
turnout levels among groups of voters, and perhaps even generations of voters, are rarely equal.  
The socioeconomic model of voter turnout (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1982; Verba and Nie 
1972) posits that an individual’s social status, including type of job, level of education, and income, is 
an important predictor of voter turnout. These studies suggest that education influences a variety of 
factors that directly influence the choice of whether to vote or not, including civic skills, political 
attitudes and feelings of efficacy, and the social networks that instil a duty to vote (Burden 2009; Emler 
and Frazer 1999). It is worth mentioning that the scholarly community is increasingly sceptical of the 
argument that education actually causes higher voter turnout, with some arguing that education level 
serves as a proxy for other factors relating to social status, family background and other early life 
influences (Burden 2009; Kam and Palmer 2008; Persson 2013). Nonetheless, the relationship 
between education and turnout has been demonstrated both in the American context and cross-
nationally, though it is important to note that some scholars have found that the predictive power of 
education is lower, or even non-significant, in some Western European countries (Gallego 2010; Norris 
2002).  
The relationship between gender and voter turnout has also been well-studied. Firstly, lower 
levels of turnout among women may, unsurprisingly, exist in places where women’s civil rights are less 
secure (Desposato and Norrander 2009). Additionally, some research has also suggested that gaps in 
political knowledge and interest between men and women may also relate to unequal levels of 
turnout (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lizotte and Sidman 2009; Mondak and Anderson 2004; Verba, 
Burns, and Schlozman 1997). These gaps in turnout could be due to a number of reasons, including 
differential educational attainment, the availability of time to devote to amassing political knowledge, 
or gendered patterns of employment.  
Voters from ethnic minorities have also been demonstrated to have lower levels of turnout 
than other voters. A variety of reasons for this phenomenon have been studied. Most scholars 
acknowledge some potential influence of lower socio-economic status among some minority voting 
groups. Other studies focus on structural barriers to voting, suggesting that lower turnout among 
minorities may be related to voter suppression, or cases of electoral laws that unfairly disadvantage 
minority groups (Hajnal, Lajevardi, and Nielson 2017). Other research suggests it is more of a matter 
of mobilization or empowerment (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004). In the American context, for 
example, Fraga (2018) finds that ethnic and racial minorities turn out to vote at lower rates largely 
because they are not mobilized to be engaged with politics.    
Finally, research has demonstrated a sizable turnout gap between citizens with and without 
disabilities. Research from the United States, for example, has suggested about a 20-point turnout gap 
between those with and without disabilities (Schur et al. 2002). This may be related to a variety of 
reasons: including polling place accessibility and lower registration rates (Schur 2013; Schur, Ameri, 
and Adya 2017). Additionally, citizens with disabilities may have lower levels of social capital (Schur et 
al. 2002), a phenomenon also found for populations with low levels of health (Mattila et al. 2013). 
These voters may also not be part of the networks that would encourage them to vote, characterized 
by higher levels of income and education. Finally, citizens with disabilities may have a lower sense of 
efficacy to participate in politics, especially if they are not part of the aforementioned social networks 
that encourage civic engagement.  
According to psychological models of voting, political interest is key to explaining whether a 
voter will turn out or not (Blais 2000). Citizens with higher levels of political interest will pay more 
attention to politics and election campaigns. Importantly, that interest may translate into greater 
political knowledge, which may decrease the information costs of voting, such as forming political 
preferences, researching candidates and determining where and when to vote (Carpini and Keeter 
1996; Popkin and Dimock 1998; Zaller 1990).  
To demonstrate the significance of the variables mentioned above, Table 1 presents a multi-
level logistic regression model of the predictors of an individual’s responses that they ‘vote always,’ 
with data from the 6th wave of the World Value Survey. Unfortunately, disability and being a member 
of an ethnic or racial minority are difficult to measure at a cross-national level and are therefore not 
included in the analysis. It also includes two important control variables related to the electoral laws 
in a country: whether voting is compulsory and the type of electoral system (Blais and Aarts 2006; 
Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). The results support the previous discussion 




Table 1: Predictors of “Vote Always”  
 (1) 





Age (linear) 0.03*** 
 (0.00) 
  
High School Education 0.14*** 
 (0.02) 
  
Post-Secondary Education 0.36*** 
 (0.02) 
  
Income Steps 0.01*** 
 (0.00) 
  
Interested in Politics 0.58*** 
 (0.02) 
  
Compulsory Voting 1.11*** 
 (0.26) 
  
Mixed Electoral System 0.26 
 (0.29) 
  









N (Individuals) 77,813 
N (Countries)  55 
Multi-level models. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
See Appendix A for more details about data.  
 
In sum, there exist clear turnout gaps based on a variety of individual characteristics, from age 
and gender to disability and health. The question now remains: how can these gaps be closed?  
Existing work on Inclusive Voting Practices 
 
Inclusive voting practices are defined in this article as policy instruments which reduce 
inequality in the electoral process for citizens, including, but not limited to the voter turnout and 
registration gap.1 There are many other aspects of the electoral process which can do this, such as the 
electoral system design. Here, we focus how citizens to register to vote and cast their ballot.   
The idea that voting processes can affect turnout, inclusivity, and by extension, democratic 
outcomes, is not new. It has been conceptually underdeveloped, however, and remains absent in 
many definitions or discussions of democracy and electoral integrity.  The traditional pillars of 
democratic theory were silent on the issue, for example.  Minimalist approaches to defining 
democracy, such as those set out by Robert Dahl (1971) and Adam Przeworski (1999) identify many 
features of elections that are prerequisites for a state to be defined as democratic – but these include 
little about how voting takes place other than that it should be done in secret.  In contrast, substantive 
theorists define democracy as the realisation of certain principles.  For David Beetham (1994), for 
example, this is political equality and popular control of government – but there is no detailed 
mapping of the electoral institutions that can help to realise this. 
Detailed policies for realizing this goal of equal turnout is more prevalent amongst the 
international community.  The third wave of democratisation and globalisation led to the 
development of global networks of international actors who sought to define standards for how 
elections should be run, which were sketched into international treaties, political agreements, 
interpretative documents and other sources (Carothers 2003; James 2020).  Such agreements have 
been consolidated into assessment manuals so that they can be used by observers to evaluate 
elections.  As the Carter Center (2014)  manual details, this includes a commitment to a variety of 
practices that seek to ensure inclusively and political equality.  To take one example, the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted in December 2006, calls on 
states to: 
 
‘ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public 
life on an equal basis with others, directly or through freely chosen representatives, including 
 
1 We should of course also be mindful of other forms on inequality in the electoral process. For example, if 
citizens are given an unequal experience at the polling stations because of their ethnicity, age or geographical 
location then this too violates the principal of inequality. An inclusive voting practice would seek to address this 
too, even though it was not directly related to turnout.   
the right and opportunity for persons with disabilities to vote and be elected (United Nations 
2007, 21).’ 
 
These agreements are landmark moments towards the realisation of inclusive voting practices. In fact, 
these statements are often taken as the definition of electoral integrity itself (Norris 2013).  They 
remain unconnected to political theory, however.  Allowing political actors to define what inclusive 
practices work removes the role of the academic research to assess, refine and change ‘best practices’. 
Modern political science largely overlooked electoral practices as an area of study, instead 
focussing on voter behaviour and the effects of electoral system, until Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s 
seminal (1980) work responding to the question Who Votes?.  They produced some of the early 
empirical work on why voting practices can make a difference. Over time, many more studies 
followed.  These were mostly based on evidence from the US, many triggered by the politics of the 
National Voter Registration Act (for a review see, James 2012). Studies gradually have expanded to 
other established democracies, however (see, for example: Bochsler 2010; Garnett 2019a, 2019b; 
Germann and Serdült 2017; James 2011).  Outside of Western democracies, work has been less 
frequently published with exceptions including Virendrakumar et al. (2018), who charted the (non) 
availability of inclusive practices for disabled voters in Africa. 
Additionally, existing research has for the most part been framed within a rational choice 
(institutionalist) framework, but this has been a subject of criticism. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
explicitly started with a rational choice conception when they explained that “...we find it useful to 
think in terms of the benefits and costs of voting to the individual… The easier it is for a person to cast 
a ballot, the more likely he is to vote,” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 6-8). Rational choice theory 
has been much criticised, however (Aldrich 1993). Given the marginal difference that a single vote can 
have – voting is an entirely irrational act anyway. It is therefore important to understand the cultural 
and normative context in which voting takes place.  As Galicki (2018, 41) argues, “voting can be viewed 
as an act of belonging or acceptance of the “system””.  She therefore sets out sociological 
institutionalism as an alternative approach.  This includes a focus on the wider set of informal norms 
and the cultural context in which individuals vote – rather than the just the formal-legal institutions 
and how they structure incentives. 
There has been some work to conceptualise different types of practices to promote equal 
turnout. For example, James uses the concepts of expansive and restrictive forms of electoral 
administration according to whether they increased or lowered turnout in a meta-analysis of earlier 
studies, and places procedures onto an 11 point ordinal continuum (James 2010).  Similarly, Pallister 
uses the term election administration inclusiveness to refer to “the degree to which the administration 
of the electoral process facilitates or hinders the ability of eligible citizens to vote” (Pallister 2017, 3).  
Procedures were then ranked on a three-point scale.   
Other work has considered the political and policy consequences of inclusive voting practices.  
Do they favour the parties or candidates from an ideological position? What are the policy 
consequences?  Are some procedures, for example, capable of redressing the severe economic 
inequalities that are present in most societies?  Some scholarship has sought to use the questions to 
argue that electoral practices have consequences for the theorisation of the state.  Theories of the 
state are meta theories about the nature of the state, it’s relationship with citizens and in whose 
interests it serves (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987).  The liberal democratic model of the state saw it as a 
neutral arbiter between competing interests.  Elite theory instead argued that the state can be shaped 
by the incumbents to suit its own interests.  James therefore argued that governing elites would be 
tempted to choose voting procedures that maximised their chances of winning seats.  Meanwhile, in 
their earlier writing, Piven and Cloward (1983) claimed that the battle for inclusive voting procedures 
involved attempts to redress racial and class struggles. 
There have been several advances, but there are also notable gaps. It seems to be widely 
recognised that normative theory is important for justifying elections as a method of rule, but says 
nothing about the details of how elections should be run.  There is evidence that voting and 
registration procedures matter, but they tend to draw on empirical studies of the US.  There are some 
theoretical works conceptualising the causal effects on institutions and citizens, but these are not 
always developed in full. 
What are the basic requirements for underlying theory? First, it must include both the effects 
of calculus as suggested by rational choice theorists and the role of cultural context set out by 
sociological institutionalists.  It is not an either/or.  Individuals are more likely to vote when it is more 
convenient for them to do so – but cultural context should matter as well (Peters 2005). 
Second, it requires a theory of causation that is sensitive to context. The same voting practices 
in one country may have different meanings in different setting.  It might not be possible to neatly 
transport and implant a policy from one jurisdiction to another.   
Thirdly, it must acknowledge that knowledge about the likely effects of reforms among the 
agents of practices can cause counter-effects.  The introduction of voter identification requirements 
might, ceteris paribus, cause voting levels to decline because some voters will not have access to the 
required ID.  However, a counter-mobilisation against ‘voter suppression’ may indirectly cause voter 
ID to have a positive effect on turnout.  The lines of causality are therefore complex. 
A Strategic-Relational Framework 
The effect that voting practices might have on voters can be conceived through a structure 
and agency relationship.  There is a rich scholarship from the social sciences on the relationship 
between structure and agency (for example, see: Hay 2002, 89-134).  Agents are the political actors 
under study – in this case voters at an aggregate and individual level.  Structure refers to the contextual 
factors that might shape the behaviour of the actors.  There are a variety of perspectives, ranging from 
an intentionalist position that emphasises the freedom of the individual to act without constraint, to 
the polar opposite structuralist position in which individuals are simply the bearers of their social 
context.  An intepretivist approach provides the exemplar of the former approach in which individual 
are given autonomy to act within their beliefs (Bevir and Rhodes 2002; Bevir 2010).  Conversely, and 
paradoxically, rational choice theory gives agents no autonomy – they are assumed to be driven by a 
logic of calculated interests which are shaped by their contextual environment (Hay 2002, 103-4). 
The strategic relational approach to structure and agency that is used in this article was 
developed by Bob Jessop (2001, 2005).   This has not been used to conceptualise the relationship 
between the citizen and electoral institutions until to now, since the common position is to use 
rational choice theory.  The strategic relational approach, however, has been used in other areas of 
study on political institutions such as the study of prime ministers (Byrne and Theakston 2018; James 
2018a). 
This approach conceptualises agents as strategic actors who are capable of free-thinking.  
However, they are situated within a strategically selective environment which might shape their 
preferences, incentives and beliefs.  It involves studying how agents might find themselves in 
situations that might ‘privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and 
temporal horizons, some actions over others; and the ways, if any, in which actors (individual and/or 
collective) take account of this differentiated privileging… when choosing a course of action’ (Jessop 
2001, 1224).  Strategically selective environments therefore do not determine outcomes because 
agents are reflexive actors capable of strategic learning.   
Importantly, the approach begins from a critical realist ontological and epistemological 
position conceptualises the world as having a stratified social reality.  There are therefore many deep 
structural causes which might not be immediately observable to the researcher using purely 
behaviouralist techniques.   These structures often include gender or class-based politics.  In the field 
of elections, this sensitises us to how individuals might be more subtly persuaded to vote or not vote.  
It is also important to note that this approach is often linked to a realist conception of knowledge.  
Rather than seeing the world as an object that can be studied in a hermetically sealed environment, 
the accumulated knowledge about the world is shared with it.  As a result, those under study can 
change their strategic behaviour, armed with this knowledge (James 2020; James 2018b).  For 
example, one research finding might be that voter identification requirements lead to lower levels of 
turnout amongst some groups.  The documentation and dissemination of this knowledge to political 
parties, activists and voters, however, might change their future behaviour.  
Causation is therefore context specific.  The use of quantitative methods can help to identify 
how institutions have shaped behaviour in the past, but it is no guarantee that these causal effects 
will reoccur in the future.  Actor have the ability for strategic learning from past experiences.  
Meanwhile, the same institutional practices may have different effects in different situations where 
cultural meanings and practices are different (James 2020, 27-8; Pawson 2006, 21). 
The strategic-relational approach has been applied to few empirical avenues of research, so the 
structures that might affect the agents under study have not yet been sketched out.  We therefore set 
out the following propositions about those which will shape individual behaviour: 
• Most obviously, electoral laws and institutions will shape whether individuals vote by 
providing the institutional environment.  At the most obvious level, legal enfranchisement is 
a pre-requisite for participation.  Requirements to provide different forms of identification, 
for example, will affect the calculus of whether to vote by making it more burdensome. 
• The technical, managerial and financial resources available to electoral officials will matter 
too.  A lack of polling staff might mean that queues will develop which could discourage voters.  
Poor or faulty equipment, lack of accessibility features for disabled voters, or reduced funding 
for voter outreach activities could be the result of financial austerity policies (James and 
Jervier 2017).  Policy instruments such as voter registration reforms can have ‘back-office’ 
effects on the running of elections, such as increased costs (James 2020).  
• Cultural practices might also be exclusionary.  The act of casting a vote is not a robotic act – 
but one which takes place in locations with embedded social meanings  (Bertrand, Briquet, 
and Pels 2007; Coleman 2013; Orr 2016). But such cultural practices and meanings are never 
neutral – they can have exclusionary dynamics.  Rituals and norms can shape expectations 
about the ‘proper’ role of individuals.  It might become ‘normalised’, for example, for women 
to vote as instructed by men in polling stations as part of a set of patriarchal power relations. 
• Strategic action of others will be important. In a world of necessity, actors will take strategic 
action to coerce or shape the behaviour of others.  In the context of elections, these tactics 
might involve campaigning behaviour around the poll which are intimidating or threatening, 
or might explicitly threaten or undertake violence against others in order to win an election 
(Birch and Muchlinski 2018). 
• Informational resources about how to register to vote and cast a ballot can shape whether 
citizens participate on Election Day.  The state may not, for example, provide clear websites 
detailing the process (Garnett 2017).  There can also be concerted disinformation campaigns 
by parties and other agents to deter some blocs of voters from participating, by claiming that 
polling stations are closed, voting hours are different to what they are or falsely suggesting 
voter identification requirements are needed (Pal 2017). 
• More deeply rooted educational resources, meanwhile, provide citizens with knowledge 
about citizenship and how they can be active in the political system.  These could be widely 
distributed, held by a minority, or widely absent in a political system. 
The generative mechanisms therefore include both culture and calculus, transcending the 
traditional institutionalist accounts of human behaviour (Peters 1999).  
 
A strategically selective environment will shape individual behaviour, but the environment 
can also be shaped over time by the actors situated within it.  As Jessop remarks, actors: 
‘orient their strategies and tactics in the light of their understanding of the current 
conjuncture and their “feel for the game”’ (Jessop 2001, 1224) 
 
It in the context of elections, citizens, activists and parties might seek to alter the laws and cultural 
practices through which elections are run to generate a new strategically selective environment.  
There is therefore an interactive relationship with agents that can change structures through 
advocacy, as figure 1 illustrates. 
 
Figure 1: The cyclical relationship between voting practices, elections and reform.  
 
State Response: Electoral Policy and Machinery 
 
If there is a strategically selective environment in which there are uneven levels of turnout 
amongst groups, how could the state respond?  We categorise state responses to the challenge of 
ensuring inclusive elections: 
 
• Repressive.  Rulers will often to shape the apparatus of the state in order to maximise their 
electoral interests.  This might involve deliberate attempts at voter intimidation, instructions 
to stuff ballot boxes, or placing polling stations in areas far away from the voter.  Repressive 
policies are therefore deliberate and partisan attempts to restrict the participation of 
particular groups with view to gaining political advantage.  This is not limited to autocracies.  
Governing elites may instead seek to deploy strategies to supress voter turnout amongst key 
groups through policies such as onerous voter identification requirements etc. 
• Laissez-faire.  Political inequality does not always come about through such active repression.  
In fact, elections could be nominally ‘free and fair’ by international standards and the criteria 
set out by minimalist democratic theorists such as Robert Dahl, but the outcomes of the 










state might, borrowing language from economic policy, take a minimalist, laissez-faire 
approach to running elections where the most basic polling provisions are provided.  Elections 
are hypothetically implemented to a high standard in so far as the rules, however the onus 
has been left to the individual to educate themselves, register and vote.  Typical policies might 
include the absence of proactive efforts to tackle underlying uneven levels of voter education 
or turnout.  Responsibility to register to vote might lie with the citizen.   
• Interventionist.  Lastly, an interventionist approach is where the state is proactive at 
identifying cultural and material inequalities in voting practices in a given socio-political 
context and develops policies to address these.  These policies will be context-specific to the 
nature of the problem. However, they might include proactive or automatic registration 
systems, election violence mitigation or social media regulation.   
The case for inclusive voting procedures 
 
If there is a strategically selective environment in which there are uneven levels of turnout 
amongst groups, how should the state respond?   
As the review above makes clear, there has rarely been a detailed, explicit link between the 
study of voting procedures and normative political theory.  An important decision has to be made for 
how to define democracy.  There are, of course, a variety of different ways of doing this.  One common 
approach is to take a minimalist approach in which a polity can be considered ‘democratic’ if we are 
able to witness the presence of certain institutional arrangements.  Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy provides 
the classic exemplar of such an approach (Dahl 1971).  Robert Dahl claimed that democracy was 
characterised by the ‘continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, 
considered as equal weights’ (Dahl 1971, 1).  Unpacking this, Dahl thought that there were eight 
institutional guarantees that would be needed for a polity to be considered a polyarchy, the ideal 
system of government.  These included the ‘right to vote’, ‘free and fair elections’ and ‘freedom of 
expression’ (ibid p.3).   
Meanwhile substantive normative theorists criticised the idea of evaluating institutions 
according to whether they match a pre-determined list of procedures.  David Beetham, for example, 
argued that doing so provides no rationale for why these institutions should be considered 
‘democratic’ (Beetham 1994, 26).  Most worryingly, basing assessments on a pre-defined list offers no 
way of considering how that list could be improved over time (Beetham 1994, 26-7).  He therefore 
encourages us to evaluate democratic institutions by the outcomes that they produce.  In particular, 
a polity can be considered democratic where it realises the goals of political equality and popular 
control of government.     
While these approaches have many differences, one theme that it is common to theme both 
is political equality remains central. The world may (or may not) involve varying levels of social and 
economic equality, but democratic institutions should neither privilege or disadvantage any citizen.  
They should be ‘considered as an equal weight’ as Dahl claims or ‘collectively considered as equal’s as 
Beetham suggests. 
Repressive electoral procedures, as sketched out above, would clearly be a violation of these 
normative goals.  It is also the case that laissez-faire policies, however, are insufficient for realising the 
ideals of political equality in a democracy.  If citizens are in strategically selective environments in 
which their propensity to vote is affected by factors outside of their control, then realising political 
equality requires intervention.  If there is electoral violence then the state response cannot be laissez-
faire – intervention is required to ensure that everyone is able to vote without intimidation.  If there 
are lower levels of electoral registration amongst young people then interventions are required to 
address to bring balance.  If voters with disabilities are less likely to vote because the polling stations 
are designed for those without disabilities, then interventions are required. 
In the sphere of economic policy, laissez-faire policies have often been grounded with a moral 
rationale. The role of government should be minimal to create free market conditions, in which 
businesses and entrepreneurs can prosper, generate profit and economic wealth. The argument of 
monetarists and free-marketeers is that mutual benefit is gained as wealth ‘trickles down’.  But there 
is no mutual gain in electoral integrity or democratic politics with state non-intervention.  Those who 
benefit are the parties, candidates and voters who are already winners; those who lose are those who 
do not participate.  Democratic states must therefore seek out and implement interventionist, 
inclusive voting practices.  
A further critical argument of intervention is that voting is an individual responsibility and the 
state should not play a proactive role in shaping individual behaviour.  These arguments are intuitively 
compatible with liberal democracy, which sprang from a defence of the rights of the individual.  The 
absence of inclusive voting practices in a strategically selective environment, however, immediately 
sees the power and equality of many individuals and groups being undermined. Without such 
interventions, individuals might find themselves with formal voting rights, but situated within a legal, 
cultural, administrative, informational and educational environment in which they are unequal to their 
peers and much more unlikely to vote than a peer.  Moreover, group inequality can be generated from 
the absence of inclusive voting practices. Societies are not collections of identical individuals. Social 
patterns, class structures, political cleavages emerge which brings divergences amongst groups 
interests. Allowing a turnout gap, without intervention is therefore a direct breach of the principles of 
democracy. 
Special Issue Ahead  
 
This introductory article has set out the concept of inclusive voting practices and given it a 
normative grounding.  What constitutes an inclusive voting practice, however, is partially contextually 
specific because it depends on the level of turnout inequality between groups in a given scenario – 
and how different policy instruments interact in different spatial-temporal environments. This special 
issue therefore pushes open a new research agenda to consider: 2 
- What are the different causal pathways for causing exclusion at the ballot box?  Who tends to 
be excluded or negatively affected by voting processes?  
- Which electoral processes are effective at ensuring inclusion?  Which are not? What proactive 
state action and regulation is required? 
- Beyond introducing political equality, what are the wider effects of inclusive voting practices? 
- Given their importance, when and why are such policies instruments not undertaken by the 
state? 
Subsequent articles take the agenda forward, beginning with Victoria Shineman who focusses 
attention on how many would-be electors are excluded from the franchise.  The move towards 
becoming a full democracy involved the franchise being extended to women, non-property owners 
and all ethnicities, but some groups remain legally unable to vote. Felons are amongst many groups 
in democracies who are acutely affected by the outcome of elections but who in some jurisdictions 
have their right to vote removed because of their prior criminal record.  Shineman considers the 
effects of restoring voting rights to felons on their attitudes and behaviors, using experimental 
treatments to help make the normative case for inclusive voting practices. 
Eric Guntermann, Ruth Dassonneville and Peter Miller look at the effects of compulsory voting.  
This is potentially one of the most important inclusive procedures because in theory it eradicates 
inequalities in turnout by ensuring everyone votes, thereby reducing the difference between rich and 
 
2 Papers were primarily drawn from leading academics and policy makers from the pre-APSA workshop on ‘Building Better 
Elections: New Challenges in Electoral Management’, held at MIT in Boston in 2018, convened by the editors. 
 
poor.  They consider whether this then also has effects on the nature of representation within 
legislatures. 
Paige Schneider and David Carroll consider the problem of electoral violence.  Violence and 
perceived threats of violence are an obvious impediment for citizens voting.  Although there has been 
considerable literature on the topic, the authors argue that the gendered nature of electoral violence 
needs to be built into any future research on the topic and has so far been overlooked.  They illustrate 
this using their ethnographic fieldwork in Uganda. 
Voter ID requirements have often been at the heart of contemporary political debate about voting 
practices.  They have been incited to be modern ‘Jim Crow laws’ because they reduce turn out amongst 
some groups, more than others.  Anthony Kimball and David C. Kimball look at the implementation of 
photo ID implementation in Missouri. Meanwhile, Toby S. James and Alistair Clark consider the uneven 
experiences of voters in English local elections.  The effects of the introduction of a set of voter ID 
pilots, the first ever in British elections is then charted. 
Citizens are often left in long lines to wait to cast their vote. Bridgett King identifies how these 
wait times and other administrative irregularities are experienced differently across different groups 
in the American electorate.  The effects of these problems on voter confidence in the electoral process 
are then mapped. 
The experience of citizens with disabilities at considered by Powell and Johnson, who note how 
they are considerably less likely to vote.  They assess the ways in which people with disabilities are 
disenfranchised by election administration barriers such as voter registration, voter identification 
regulation and methods of ballot submission, using survey data from the US. 
Another community to be legally disenfranchised are non-resident citizens, who might wish to 
vote abroad.  Kevin Pallister notes that many countries have reformed policies to enable them to vote.  
Pallister identifies the drivers for these reforms in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala to help to 
identify generalisations about when and why moves to inclusive practices might occur. 
The coverage of the articles is therefore geographically extensive and cover many voting practices.  
The articles collectively help to establish what practices constitute inclusive voting practices, what 
their effects are, and what the drivers might be. In the concluding article we draw out the lessons from 
the special issue as a whole for the study of democracy and electoral institutions.  We think that a 
profound rethinking of the concept is needed so that it includes the provision of inclusive electoral 
practices.  We also set out the policy lessons for the international community and governments 
worldwide, upon whom the burden lies to respond to the research and introduce inclusive electoral 
practices. 
  
Appendix A: Variables and Data Sources for Table 1 
Variable Details 
Individual Level  
Gender 0 Male 
1 Female 
Age Continuous Variable (16-99) 
Education What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 
0. No formal education  
1. Incomplete primary school 
2. Complete primary school  
3. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational  
4. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational 
5. Incomplete secondary school: university preparatory  
6. Complete secondary school: university- preparatory  
7. Some university-level education, without completion 
8. University - level education, with degree 
 
Reduced to three categories:  
0. Did not complete, or less than secondary education (reference) 
1. Completed secondary education 
2. Some or completed university-level education 
Income On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group 
and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in 
what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, 
counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.  
0. Lower step 
1. Second step 
… etc.  
9. Tenth step 






Reduced to two categories:  
0. Usually or never (combined since there is often a bias towards stating that 
one usually votes) 
1. Always 
Political Interest How interested would you say you are in politics? 
 
0. Very interested  
1. Somewhat interested 
2. Not very interested 
3. Not at all interested 
 
Reduced to two categories:  
0. Not at all or not very interested.  
1. Somewhat or very interested 
Country-Level  
Compulsory Voting 0. Not compulsory 
1. Compulsory 
Electoral System 0 Plurality/Majoritarian 
1 Mixed 
2 Proportional Representation 
(Categorical variable with plurality/majoritarian as reference category) 
 
Datasets 
• WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 6 2010-2014 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20150418. For more details, see: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp  



























• Trinidad and Tobago 
• Egypt 
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